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Racism and Liberalism: Comments on Brian Thomas‘s ―Post-Rawlsian Movements, 




Brian Thomas makes a convincing case for the inadequacy of Will Kymlicka‘s social philosophy 
in relation to the problems of racism Black Americans and Canadians face.   As Thomas notes, 
Kymlicka fails both in his diagnosis of the problem and in his suggested remedies.  Yet Thomas 
finds enough worthwhile in Kymlicka to try and refit the theory in relation to racism.  Here I will 
argue that Thomas may be unduly optimistic. 
 Contemporary communitarianism arose in part as a reaction against liberalism.  And 
while there are thinkers who have tried to draw from both theories, it isn‘t clear that a coherent 
synthesis is possible.  The two may be incommensurable.  Kymlicka wants to add to the rational 
self-interested individual of liberal theory a narratively situated individual whose good or well-
being is understood only within a particular narrative tradition.  Thus Kymlicka is prepared to 
acknowledge group rights, unlike traditional liberalism.   
But how is this addition to be effected?  In the service of the liberal individualist ideal, 
apparently.  We are to acknowledge group rights when we recognize the importance of particular 
social contexts for the development and practice of autonomy, a liberal, individualist good.  
Kymlicka‘s theory recognizes the individual as the primary unit of value along with the primacy 
of liberal goods like equality, autonomy, and freedom.  
 Here I want to argue that liberalism as a social philosophy lacks the resources to 
reconstruct itself in face of devastating critiques by philosophers like Michael Sandel and 
Alasdair MacIntyre.  On this account, Kymlicka‘s theoretical shortfall in respect of anti-black 
racism will be both predictable and irreparable. 
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 For MacIntyre and Sandel, liberal individualism represents a misleading and 
impoverished view of the self and society.  The liberal self has individual freedom as its highest 
good.  Hence the choices it makes are sovereign, ultimately unimpeachable by others.  Freedom 
of choice is seen as good in itself.  As Sandel puts it, there is a virtual religion of self-worship 
here.  This self is essentially individual or atomic.  All its relations to others are voluntary and 
revocable, none constitutive.  Hence it will be slow to act the citizen, quick to divorce, inclined 
to consign aging parents to the care of strangers, inclined to neglect children in favor of its 
individual pursuits or even to abort their lives should they interfere with its plans. 
But this decontextualized, dehistoricized, deracialized, denationalized, stripped-down self 
is the idealized hallucination of liberalism. As Plato shows so well in the Republic, societies are 
like factories for producing a certain type of individual.  In this society, success can mean greater 
isolation from others (cf. Philip Slater‘s Pursuit of Loneliness).  Isolated, we oscillate between 
what Robert Bellah et al termed competitive individualism at work and expressive individualism 
at home.   
Is it any wonder then that the liberal self neither recognizes nor particularly 
acknowledges its own implication in the group harm of racism?  Thus the familiar white 
disavowal: ―I never held slaves or engaged in prejudicial practices, hence am innocent of my 
society‘s racist track record.‖  But like it or not, the actual history of African America and its 
legacy to this day affords these whites an artificial, unearned advantage.  Just as we may inherit 
certain social goods, so we may inherit social debts, a concept unavailable either in concept or 
disposition to the liberal self.   Individualist stories about the self to the contrary notwithstanding, 
in actuality we are very much defined by our relations to others, perhaps most especially by 
those we have not elected. 
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The liberal notion of justice suffers similar maladies.  Alasdair MacIntyre diagnoses these 
problems in his four stage description of liberalist justice.  At the first level, individuals and 
groups simply express their preferences.  So, for example, some Americans favor affirmative 
action while others do not.  A rational address of differences at this level would require 
philosophical investigation and argument.  But the liberalist obscures this need by reducing 
various positions about the good to mere preferences, as in a market system.  Within such a 
system of preferences the ability to bargain becomes paramount.  Anyone without the needed 
means to do so will be quite disadvantaged in liberalist society.  The disadvantage will be 
greatest for economically marginalized minorities.  Bargaining takes place through non-rational 
persuasion as the only kind available once claims of  rational rightness are reduced to preference. 
At the second level of liberal justice, preferences are tallied (as in utilitarianism) to 
determine what should be done.  Such a vote would ideally tell us what to do regarding 
affirmative action programs, for instance.  MacIntyre notes that such a tally presupposes a shared 
notion of rational principles.  But if the various preferences are conclusions of conflicting 
philosophies, they are more than preferences: they are products of practical reasoning.  To treat 
them as mere opinions is irrational and to tally them up together with the conclusions of 
antagonistic rivals absurd.  So the lack of a shared rationality about the tally leaves it 
unsupported. 
The third level of liberal justice is the debate between liberalists about what counts as a 
fair method for weighing preferences.  Corrections for inequality such as affirmative action are 
debated at this level.  As MacIntyre notes, the various liberal theories about this matter are as 
much at odds with each other as ever.  So it is more the fact that such debate goes on, rather than 
any substantive conclusions, that is supposed to justify the liberalist procedures.  Yet since these 
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deliberations are ultimately about practical policies, there has to be a tie-breaker between 
conflicting views. 
The fourth level breaks the tie.  The fourth level involves appeals to the rules and 
procedures of the legal system.  We could take our affirmative action case to the Supreme Court, 
for example. The fourth level functions to enforce liberalist conflict resolution without invoking 
an overarching concept of the good or, rather, by pretending not to do so.    
 How then is Thomas able to make out the salient contours of anti-black racism where 
Kymlicka falls short?  Thomas provides a thicker description of the black predicament by 
reference to the relevant narrative setting and history, describing a people, not simply a 
collection of individuals. This portrayal reflects a different frame of reference from the liberal, 
one more social and communitarian, the same frame reflected in documents like the Black 
National Anthem. Were this implicit frame developed sufficiently, it would provide a superior 
alternative to liberalism.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
